

A RAND NOTE

EXTENDED CONTAINMENT: COUNTERING SOVIET
IMPERIALISM AND APPLYING ECONOMIC REALISM

Charles Wolf, Jr.

April 1983

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Prepared for

The Ford Foundation

A Series in International
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PREFACE

This Note contains an essay that was written as a chapter for a forthcoming book on "Alternative American Foreign Policies Toward the Soviet Union," organized and edited by Professor Aaron Wildavsky at the University of California, Berkeley. The book is to be published by the Institute of Contemporary Studies in San Francisco. Contributors were asked to consider alternatives to current policy and to recommend any changes which they believed would be desirable and feasible. Besides Wildavsky, the other contributors are Professors Ernst Haas and Paul Seabury (University of California, Berkeley), James Payne (Texas A & M), Robert Tucker (Johns Hopkins), and Mr. Max Singer.

Early drafts of the individual chapters were discussed and critiqued by the contributors at a conference in Berkeley, February 24-26, 1983. A roundtable discussion of the different views was presented by the authors at the Annual meeting of the Institute of Contemporary Studies on February 25.

The author is indebted for comments on an early draft of this essay to the other contributors, as well as to his Rand colleagues, Dr. Nathan Leites and Dr. Peter Stan, and for editorial assistance to Mr. Malcolm Palmatier.

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fund the preparation of relevant sponsored research that might otherwise not be disseminated to the general public.

All research products are being made available to as wide an audience as possible through publication as unclassified Rand reports or notes, or in journals. The Rand documents may be obtained directly or may be found in the more than 300 libraries in the United States and 35 other countries that maintain collections of Rand publications.

SUMMARY

This essay presents two ideas for extending the existing containment policy of the United States to improve its effectiveness. One of the extensions would express and provide U.S. support for genuine and legitimate movements seeking liberation from Soviet imperialism in the Third World. The other extension is concerned with developing and applying a policy of "economic realism" in trade, credit, and technology transactions between West and East.

Before considering these policy extensions, the essay contrasts two different sets of beliefs concerning the nature of the Soviet system and the objectives and motivations of its leaders. It is suggested that these different beliefs underlie the conflicting positions on specific policy issues which are advocated by particular people and organizations in the U.S. policy community.

One set of beliefs, termed "mirror imaging" (MI), holds that, while the Soviet Union is often aggressive in its external behavior, this aggressiveness springs from its history and its understandable preoccupation with defense. According to the MI view, notwithstanding such aggressive behavior, the Soviet Union and the Soviet system and leadership really are motivated by values similar to those maintained by the West, namely human betterment, peace, prosperity, and justice.

The opposite viewpoint, termed "power maximizing" (PM), holds that, whatever the experiences of Soviet history, and whatever the philosophical antecedents of Soviet communism, the true and overriding objective of the system and its leadership is maximization of the political and military power of the Soviet state at home and abroad.

In light of these conflicting beliefs, quite different prescriptions are advocated with respect to particular policy issues. In general, the MI point of view subscribes to more limited forms of containment, and to more conciliatory and even concessionary policies by the West toward the Soviet Union. The implicit premise is that, since the Soviets really cherish values similar to those of the West, accommodating behavior by the West is likely to elicit over time a

symmetrical, conciliatory response by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the power-maximizing viewpoint holds that concessions or conciliation will simply be exploited by the Soviet Union in the interests of expanding its power, to the jeopardy of Western interests and values.

The author acknowledges that his own views run closer to those associated with the PM beliefs. Hence, the two specific proposals that are made for extending containment tend to accord with the PM beliefs.

The first proposal is to match the Soviet policy of supporting "wars of national liberation" by developing a U.S. policy of providing limited and measured support for legitimate movements seeking national liberation from communist imperialism (MNLCI). The essay explains the reasons for making unequivocally clear that such support will be measured and limited rather than unbounded, and suggests criteria for choosing "legitimate" candidate movements. Part of this proposal for countering Soviet imperialism entails development of a counter to the Soviet use of proxy Cuban, East German, and Nicaraguan forces in the Third World, rather than committing Soviet combat forces directly. This part of the proposal would establish a loose coalition of "associated country forces," drawn from such countries as South Korea, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Venezuela, and Taiwan, whose interests converge with those of the United States in reversing the spread of communist-dominated regimes in the Third World. The proposal then suggests some of the changes in U.S. resource allocations, governmental organization, and the planning and programming of economic and security assistance that would be necessary to implement this aspect of extended containment.

In sum, this proposal would extend containment by subjecting the expansion of the Soviet empire to competition and possible reversal, rather than simply containment. Whereas existing containment policy only affects the *rate* at which Soviet imperial expansion occurs, extended containment would try to affect the *sign* or direction of that expansion, as well. Soviet leadership would face the prospect that its empire might contract, rather than expand.

The second proposal focuses on United States policy toward economic relations with the Soviet Union. The proposed policy of "economic realism" would eschew both the subsidization that arose during the 1970s to encourage East-West transactions, as well as the intermittent policies of embargoes or sanctions that also periodically arose to terminate such transactions. Economic realism would avoid both subsidies and embargoes (with the exception of tightened restrictions on militarily-related technology transfers), while letting the market function to facilitate or foreclose particular transactions. To implement economic realism in East-West economic relations, several "rules of the game" are proposed. They include termination of loan or investment guarantees that involve government underwriting, withdrawal of concessionary interest terms on loans to government or commercial borrowers in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, and withdrawal of preferential tax treatment on individual or corporate income derived from transactions with the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. The purpose of these rules is to help, if only modestly, to constrain Soviet allocation decisions, to impede the management and expansion of the Soviet empire and, hopefully rather than assuredly, to bring resource pressures to bear on the Soviet Union which, in the longer run, will tend to reduce its military buildup.

The Note goes on to consider and to rebut two arguments often raised against such attempts to put "teeth" into the rules of the game of East-West commerce. One argument is that such measures would amount to "economic warfare;" the second argument is that collective action, by Western Europe and Japan in concert with the United States, is unlikely, and unilateral application of these rules would have only negligible effects.

Finally, the Note considers alternative hypotheses concerning the effect of a policy of economic realism on Soviet behavior. The conclusion is reached that Soviet behavior is more likely to be driven by internal forces than by such external changes in West-east economic relations. However, a policy of economic realism would at least reduce the resources available to the Soviet leadership with which to pursue its goals. Reduced resource availability would affect Soviet behavior

only modestly and over the longer run. This argues for moving United States policy in an economically realistic direction sooner, rather than later.

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I. BACKGROUND: 'MIRROR-IMAGING' AND 'POWER-MAXIMIZING' VIEWS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM

Disputes about U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union usually focus on specific issues: for example, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF); "two-tracks," and zero or other options in Europe; human rights and Helsinki's "basket 9"; East-West trade, credit, and technology transactions; the Yamal pipeline. Whatever the content of these disputes, their *source* typically lies elsewhere. It lies in the fundamentally different beliefs held by the disputants concerning the Soviet system, how it behaves and responds, and the objectives and motivations of its leaders. These differences underlie and explain the contrasting positions on specific issues, as well as the general foreign policy stances, adopted by such antagonists as, say, Walter Mondale and Ronald Reagan; Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski; George Kennan and Paul Nitze; Marshall Shulman and Richard Pipes; Tom Wicker and William Safire; or the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*.

These differing beliefs--perhaps "premises" is more accurate--are usually strongly held, but seldom acknowledged. Indeed, they are typically so strongly held that the axioms of cognitive dissonance apply to them: any fact that is apparently inconsistent with them is either (a) dismissed as deception and falsehood, or (b) interpreted in such a sophisticated manner as to be construed as proof rather than disproof of the maintained belief.

Because these fundamental beliefs are usually unacknowledged, or even subconscious, the specific disputes that spring from them are like the images seen by Socrates' cave-dwellers: reflections of a distant reality, rather than the reality itself.

Because these beliefs are highly resistant to evidence that is inconsistent with them, they rarely change. To the extent that they are deeply held yet difficult to explicate, they appear to be similar to what Michael Polanyi referred to as "tacit knowledge." Yet to the extent that they avoid or dismiss evidence that is inconsistent with them, they represent dogma rather than knowledge, tacit or otherwise.

Nevertheless, it would be refreshing to see the underlying beliefs plainly identified at the outset of a discussion of policies and policy alternatives, rather than hidden from it. At least, this would help those whose minds are not already made up. It might also help those whose minds *are* made up to arrive at "second-order agreement": namely, a mutual understanding of what precisely they disagree about, and what evidence would be required by each party to alter its position.

Toward this end, I will begin by stating what seem to me the two conflicting views about the nature of the Soviet system and the motivations and objectives of its leaders, views that underlie many of the disputes that arise about specific issues and policies. I will also indicate where my own predispositions lie, because this affects the new measures I shall propose later to extend U.S. containment policies. I do not mean to imply, of course, that the two sets of beliefs are the only possible ones; combinations and nuances occur. Not everybody subscribes exactly to one of the two views. Yet the two contrasting positions capture something fundamental about what separates many of the people, institutions, and organizations active in the U.S. policy community, and account to a considerable degree for the alignments that emerge on specific issues.

For convenient, if not entirely accurate, reference, I will label the two views as "mirror imaging" (MI) and "power-maximizing" (PM).

The mirror-imaging view of the Soviet system and its leadership holds that Soviet preoccupation with defense grows out of Russian history and culture. Admittedly, this preoccupation may border on paranoia, and consequently may take quite aggressive forms. Such manifestations, however, are considered understandable in the light of Soviet history, including the experience of Western efforts from 1917 to 1920 to abort the Bolshevik Revolution, the 20 million casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II, and the virulently anti-communist rhetoric that sometimes emanates from right wing circles in the West. Soviet preoccupation with military strength, and the resulting priority accorded to allocating resources and technology to the military, are, according to MI, explained mainly by this history. But for MI, the long-term aims of the Soviet system are much like our

own: human betterment and well-being, combined with peace, prosperity, and justice. According to MI, a more forthcoming U.S. foreign policy, one that combines firmness with concessions, is likely to produce over time a symmetrical rather than an exploitative response from the Soviet leadership, as well as an irenic evolution of the Soviet system.

The "power-maximizing" view holds that, whatever the bitter and tragic experiences of Soviet history, and whatever the philosophical and ideological antecedents of Soviet communism, the overriding objective of the system as an operating reality is to maximize the political and military power of the Soviet state at home and to expand it abroad. According to the PM view, concessions made to the Soviet Union by the United States or the West, and agreements and transactions with it, are fair game for exploitation and deception by the Soviets in the interests of maximizing its power and expansion. PM denies, or at least seriously doubts, that economic and social betterment are basic goals of the system as an operating entity. Instead, PM views their sacrifice as readily acceptable to the Soviet leadership, even obscurely welcomed by it in the interests of justifying the enhancement of Soviet vigilance and power, as a response to ubiquitous and polymorphic external and internal "threats."

The key difference between PM and MI lies in the actions and dispositions they entail for dealing with the Soviet Union. Those observers adhering to MI may favor a policy of accommodation or, at most, of limited containment. However, they will be relaxed, compared with PM adherents, about the consequences of Soviet "gains" if containment does not work. After all, such gains may entail some gains for us too. If you are an MI adherent, you are disposed to the view that Soviet gains may provide some reassurance to the Soviets and an easing of their defensive paranoia. This in turn will enable us to live more amicably with them.

By contrast, those adhering to the PM view regard Soviet realization of gains as much closer to a "zero-sum" process: gains realized by the Soviet Union contribute to its expanded power, and thereby to its further expansion. The result works increasingly to the detriment of the United States, which is why resistance and reversal of Soviet expansion are important in the eyes of PM adherents.

Holders of the PM view tend to endorse the disestablishment of the Soviet empire by all prudent means. Several of the ideas I will present later reflect this disposition. By contrast, adherents of MI tend to disagree with these ideas and the purpose to which they are addressed. For, say the mirror-imagers, Soviet gains are not really too significant. After all, these apparent gains are beset by costs and uncertainties (e.g., Poland and Afghanistan). And, if such gains do contribute to Soviet self-confidence, that may be good for us, too (i.e., MI is a *non-zero-sum* process.)

Another striking contrast between the two views lies in their divergent positions concerning nuclear deterrence.

Holders of the MI view gravitate toward a "mutual assured destruction" view of deterrence. Threatening Soviet leadership with a second-strike capability, one that can inflict huge casualties on *population and civil industry*, will, according to MI adherents, suffice to deter Soviet attack on the United States and (less assuredly) on our NATO allies. Why? Because these targets are held to represent the fundamental *values* that are, through mirror-imaging, attributed to Soviet leadership by reason of the fact that they represent fundamental values to which we ourselves adhere. *Countervalue* then is the name of the deterrence game, and the values implied are precisely the ones we ourselves cherish.

By contrast, the PM view suggests that power, rather than human life and well-being, is the preeminent "value" motivating the Soviet party and state. Hence, nuclear deterrence should rely more heavily on an assured capability to strike the military forces, bases, and command and control centers on which Soviet power depends. Because, according to the PM view, the instruments of Soviet power are the leadership's quintessential "values," *counterforce* targeting is likely to be a more effective deterrent than targeting people and civil industry. According to the PM position, counterforce *is* countervalue!

As I have indicated, my own position is close to the PM view; this will be evident in some of the proposals I advance below for "extended containment." It is, nevertheless, important to recognize that many, and perhaps most, putative "experts" on the Soviet Union subscribe to the MI

view, as does each of the first named members of the six paired adversaries mentioned at the outset of this essay, as well as most of our European allies.

Two brief quotations convey, rather cogently I believe, the essentials of the PM position. The first quotation is by a former professor and chairman of the department of civil law at Leningrad University, Olympiad Ioffe; the second is by Milovan Djilas, whose intimate experience with Soviet as well as Yugoslav communism extends over four or five decades.

According to Professor Ioffe:

The consistent policy of the Soviet State is to subordinate purely economic goals to the aim of building unlimited political power . . . and the legal regulation of the Soviet economy is carefully designed to implement that policy . . . The leadership has made the economy work splendidly as the source of its dictatorship. In this regard, Soviet economic policy has never suffered a single real failure . . . The Soviet economy is inefficient only as a source of material wellbeing, [but] material welfare there is simply incompatible with the aims of the Soviet system . . . What could be done . . . to improve fundamentally the Soviet economy as a source of material welfare, without simultaneously undercutting the might of the state? Given the existing political system, only one answer is possible--nothing.¹

According to Mr. Djilas:

Soviet communism . . . is a military empire. It was transformed into a military empire in Stalin's time. Internally, such structures usually rot . . . but to avoid internal problems, they may go for expansion. The West must be strong if it wants to save peace and stop Soviet expansionism. If it is stopped, the process of rotting will go faster.²

As I have implied above, the PM view underlies some of the specific directions for U.S. policy that I will propose later in this essay. Of course, I cannot prove or test, in any meaningful sense, the hypothesis

¹Olympiad S. Ioffe, "Law and Economy in the USSR," *Harvard Law Review*, May 1982, pp. 1591, 1625.

² *The Wall Street Journal*, October 20, 1982, p. 33.

embodied in this view. A few salient considerations, however, seem to me to provide support for this view of the Soviet Union in contrast to the MI view.

1. While Marxist-Leninist ideology proclaims economic and social well-being for the masses as the ultimate aim of the system, the system's performance is very different. Reality has involved much more limited rates of improvement in civilian consumption, nutrition, housing, and health than have been experienced in Western economic systems. The Soviet Union is the only industrialized country in the world in which life expectancy has decreased and infant mortality has increased in the past decade--at the same time as Soviet military power has grown enormously and expensively.
2. The declared political aim of the Soviet system is to move toward a "dictatorship of the proletariat," with the working class playing a leading role in the process. Again, the reality is quite different: namely, dictatorship *to* the proletariat, as blatantly illustrated by the military suppression of Poland's trade union movement since December 1981.
3. The social aim of Marxism-Leninism is a classless society. The reality of the system is a rigid hierarchy within each of the three dominant bureaucracies: party, government, and the military. Within each are sharp differences of power, privilege, and perquisites among the controlling elites.
4. In terms of economic performance (but not in terms of power maximization), the communist system has been relatively unsuccessful. In the Soviet Union, over the past decade (and prospectively over the next decade), the economy has shown declining rates of growth in real GNP, increasing capital-output ratios, declining labor productivity and total factor productivity, and only very limited improvements in personal consumption, as noted above.

5. Only in one field has the system been strikingly successful: the development of military and political power. In the Soviet Union, there has been an extraordinary buildup of nuclear and conventional power, of ground forces, naval forces, and air forces. Growth of real defense spending has been sustained over the last decade at a rate slightly above that of the growth of the Soviet economy as a whole. Growth of Soviet military investment--that is, procurement of military equipment--has been substantially larger than that of the United States. In most other communist systems too--e.g., Cuba, Nicaragua, Viet Nam, North Korea-- the most dramatic evidence of sustained growth is found in military forces and military production rather than in civilian economic development and betterment.

With this as background, let me turn to two ideas for extending containment in new directions. One direction is concerned with countering and reversing the expansion of the Soviet empire; the other is concerned with realistic rules for the conduct of economic relations with the Soviet Union in an environment of "extended containment." I intend these as extensions, rather than as a fundamental revamping, of containment. "Extended containment" like "extended deterrence" is not without its limits. The reasons for advocating these extensions lie in the unsatisfactory outcomes that have resulted from "limited" containment--that is, from U.S. policies that have, at their best, faced the Soviet Union with uncertainty concerning the *rate* of its expansion, not the *sign*. "Extended containment," in the proposals described below, would change this by providing *competition* for gains that the Soviets have already enjoyed, as well as containment of further gains. Thus, the Soviet Union would face uncertainty as to the sign as well as the rate of expansion of its empire.

II. 'ANTI-IMPERIALISM' AND 'ASSOCIATED COUNTRY FORCES'

The years since World War II have seen either the demise or the severe diminution of the colonial empires of the past--British, French, Japanese, and Dutch. The less formal reflections of U.S. "hegemony" in various parts of the world have also waned sharply after their transitory appearance in the 1950s and 1960s. Only the Soviet empire, despite occasional setbacks, has expanded in a sustained and substantial manner.

Is it appropriate to use the term "empire" to describe the Soviet Union's expansion?

There are, of course, three different Soviet empires: the empire "at home"--that is, the empire that lies within the geographic boundaries of the Soviet state; the geographically contiguous part of the empire--that is, Eastern Europe and, more recently, Afghanistan; and the empire "abroad."

The empire "at home" is the subject of Hélène Carrère d'Encausse's recent study.¹ This use of the term derives from the fact that the Soviet Union is a multinational state, consisting of 15 distinct national republics and over 60 nationalities, 23 of which have populations larger than a million. The internal empire is not principally the result of the communist state, but rather of the eastward expansion of Czarist Russia during the century before the Leninist revolution. In the following remarks, I will be referring to the two other Soviet empires, not to this internal dimension.

In the past dozen years or so, the Soviet imperium has come to include Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Benin, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Syria, and Libya, in addition to its prior and continuing satellites, allies, and associates in Eastern Europe, Cuba, and, more ambiguously, North Korea. Of course, the pattern and degree of Soviet influence or control vary considerably across these countries.

¹See Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt*, 1979.

Among these countries and regions, Eastern Europe and North Korea may represent opposite ends of the spectrum of Soviet control, with the others falling at various points in between. Nevertheless, all of them lie within the "sliding scale of political terminology" used by Hobson to reflect the meaning of "empire" in his classic study of the nineteenth-century British version.²

Although there have been some Soviet setbacks (e.g., Somalia, Egypt, and Indonesia), the gains and extensions of the Soviet empire have vastly exceeded its losses and retrenchments. This is not to deny that the Soviet Union is beset by serious problems in Eastern Europe and on its eastern border with China, to say nothing of its increasingly serious economic, social, and ethnic problems at home. Nor does it deny that the acquisition and expansion of the empire impose significant economic costs on the Soviet economy. However, the benefits to the Soviet Union resulting from the empire--political benefits, both at home and abroad, and tangible military benefits in terms of increasing the effectiveness and operating range of Soviet military forces, as a result of bases and base rights in various parts of the empire--are likely to appear to the Soviet leadership quite substantial in relation to these costs. Consequently, we probably should expect continued efforts by the Soviet Union to expand its empire.

Current U.S. containment policy lacks any appropriate response to counter or reverse this trend. To reduce the Soviet empire requires a basic policy resolution, as well as the development of prudential means for implementation. This is the reason why an extension of containment that is explicitly "anti-imperialist" as well as supportive of pluralism and self-determination is needed in U.S. foreign policy. To formulate

²See J. A. Hobson, *Imperialism*, New York, 1975, p. 15. It is worth recalling Hobson's remark concerning the "quibbles about the modern meaning of the terms 'imperialism' and 'empire.'" Hobson's use of the term encompassed, within the British empire, areas that Britain "annexed or otherwise asserted political sway over," and he acknowledged that there is a "sliding scale of political terminology along which no man's land, or hinterland, passes into some kind of definite protectorate" (*ibid.*). A similarly elastic terminology is implied in my use of the term empire to refer to the various forms of political sway, influence, and "protectorate" that the Soviet Union has acquired in the past decade.

this extension requires a brief consideration of how the Soviet Union has expanded its empire in the past decade.

The dramatic expansion of the Soviet empire has been accomplished through a skillful combination of military power, political adroitness, covert operations, economic and financial support, and organizational inventiveness. Expansion of the empire has evolved from two broad doctrinal positions whose loose rhetoric allows ample room for adaptation to specific opportunities and circumstances: first, the doctrine of support for "wars of national liberation" from Western colonialism and imperialism; and, second, the Brezhnev doctrine of Soviet support for "fraternal states" in which communism is threatened by efforts to undermine it.

Under the ideological appeal of these doctrines, the Soviet Union has successfully managed a wide range of policy instruments to expand its domain: providing trade subsidies and export credits; extending economic assistance; providing military equipment and training; furnishing airlift, sealift, logistic support, and command, control, communications and intelligence (C³I) services in support of foreign operations; and developing and managing Cuban and East German allied or proxy forces for combat, internal security, and police roles abroad. In these operations, Soviet combat forces have rarely been used directly, except as a last resort in such exceptional circumstances as Afghanistan.

Current U.S. containment policy is conceptually, materially, and organizationally ill-suited to contest and reverse the operational techniques--political, military, and economic--by which the Soviet Union has expended its empire. Indeed, Soviet efforts to expand the empire have been considerably more subtle, flexible, and adroit than U.S. efforts to contain them. Use of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)--to look ahead--may be valuable in certain extreme contingencies, such as seizing and protecting oil production centers on the eastern or western side of the Persian Gulf, as well as ports along the Gulf. But such uses are likely to be rare. If attempts were made to use the RDF in the more likely and recurring appearances of Cuban or East German proxy forces in such ambivalent and localized contingencies as Angola, South Yemen, and Ethiopia, the result would probably be to engender hostility

abroad and to lose political support at home. These are precisely the kinds of contingencies that have arisen in the past decade in the Caribbean and Latin America, as well as in Africa and the middle East, and that have provided opportunities for the Soviet Union to expand its empire. Such contingencies are likely to provide similar opportunities in the next decade as well.

To extend existing U.S. containment policy, so that it confronts more realistically and effectively the realities of Soviet imperial expansion, requires a combination of new declaratory policies, reallocation of U.S. resources, organizational changes within the Executive Branch, altered policies for guiding the programming of military and economic assistance, and changes in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy.³ These changes would focus principally on U.S. policies in that amorphous and heterogeneous group of countries loosely referred to as "the Third World."

DECLARATORY POLICIES

Extended containment requires two innovations in U.S. declaratory policies. The first is a declaration of explicit and overt--yet selective, limited, and measured--support for genuine and legitimate movements within the Third World that seek to achieve liberation from communist imperialism and totalitarianism, and that also seek to advance more pluralistic, open, and at least aspiringly democratic forms of government. Achieving support both at home and abroad for such a declaratory policy requires emphasis on both the positive elements, indicating what the policy seeks to achieve, and the negative elements, plainly labeling what the policy opposes.

The anti-communist liberation movements that we may wish to support are not likely to be ideal-type democracies, either in operation or in aspiration. Instead, they will usually be characterized by elements of demagoguery, elitism, repression, and even brutality. These characteristics, where they occur, should be recognized and labeled for

³For a more extended discussion of some of these aspects, see my "Beyond Containment: Reshaping U.S. Policies Toward the Third World," *California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy*, September, 1982, pp. 1-29, and "Beyond Containment: Redesigning American Policies," *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1982, pp. 107-117.

what they are. At the same time, we should emphasize the elements of openness and pluralism that should differentiate the movements we might support from the communist totalitarianism they seek to supplant. We should emphasize the positive differences in favor of movements we choose to support, while acknowledging the shortcomings that remain.⁴ Like the Soviet doctrine of support for "wars of national liberation," the doctrine of support for *Movements of National Liberation from Communist Imperialism* (MNLCI) should be overt and explicit, and not directed principally toward *covert* assistance. Equally important, such support should be limited in scope and magnitude. It should be confined to selected contingencies in which the "legitimacy" and demonstrated capabilities of a candidate movement augur well for effective and successful utilization of the limited support to be provided. Yet the real uncertainties involved in providing such support should be explicitly recognized as part of the declaratory policy. It should be understood that implementation will entail losses as well as gains: "calculated" losses are to be anticipated along with the expected gains. Recognition that the outcome is uncertain is essential to avoid escalation of the intentionally limited support.⁵

Where might such movements arise? Prospects are modest at best. The principal reason is that communist systems accord such high priority to strengthening their repression, surveillance, and security apparatus that aborning movements seeking "national liberation" tend to be spotted early and ruthlessly crushed or coopted. The Shah's heralded and hated

⁴An example of what I have in mind is provided by the State Department's recent report to Congress, *Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1982*, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. With rare exceptions, the most egregious violations of human rights occur within the communist states. The report contrasts the more pervasive and subtle violations occurring in communist systems with those occurring elsewhere, without thereby absolving the latter.

⁵Anticipation of losses creates an obvious temptation to proceed covertly and thereby avoid damage to U.S. prestige, a temptation that should be resisted for several reasons. One reason is that, to acquire and sustain support within the United States for the policy redirection I am proposing, prior debate, including recognition of costs as well as of benefits, is necessary. Without the former, the credibility of the latter will be diminished. Another reason is simply the difficulty of assuring covertness, and the high likelihood, in the U.S. context, that efforts to do so will backfire.

security system, Savak, was evidently much less extensive and thorough than Castro's "normal" state security apparatus. Under the circumstances, fledgling MNLCIs will face an uphill struggle to get started. But the startup is a problem they must solve themselves if their prospects for survival, growth, and legitimacy are to be helped by limited and measured U.S. support. Among countries in the Soviet empire where such possibilities exist are Nicaragua, South Yemen, Mozambique, Angola, Benin, and Cuba. Genuine and legitimate MNLCIs in two or three communist states would turn what has been a one-sided communist-led "national liberation" arena into a more genuinely competitive one.

The Western media and the American Congress have often gone out of their way to uncover some elements of "legitimacy" (e.g., land reform, or reducing exploitation and inequality) in communist-led guerrilla movements. The Sandinista movement in Nicaragua was one example; currently El Salvador is another. One sign of success for the policy redirection I am proposing would be registered when the media and Congress can be brought to discern some degree of current or potential "legitimacy" in the anti-communist guerrilla movements seeking national liberation from communist imperialism.

A second innovation in U.S. declaratory policies would affirm a U.S. intention to collaborate with, and provide support for, certain *associated countries* whose interests converge with those of the United States in opposing the use of communist proxy forces in the Third World, and in advancing more pluralistic and open societies in these areas. The countries that might participate in such a loose association with the United States need be no closer geographically to the areas in which their forces might operate than those areas are to the Cuban and East German forces associated with the Soviet Union.

By focusing on such "associated countries," this doctrine would not exclude the possibility of collaboration with our traditional NATO allies in activities outside the NATO area as well. The aim would merely be to give greater attention to such Third World countries as South Korea, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Venezuela, and Taiwan as more promising candidates for these collaborative roles than our traditional European allies.

REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

To implement these new declaratory policies, modest reallocations of defense resources would be necessary. If these incremental needs were met by increasing budgets, such reallocations would obviously be easier. To the extent that they must instead be met within existing or planned budget levels, the choices would be harder. Underlying this proposal is an important assumption: that the balance of forces in the strategic area (especially if a suitable basing mode for the MX can be formulated) and in the NATO area (assuming that some INF deployment goes forward, together with suitable modernization of conventional NATO forces) is more stable and secure than is the balance in the Third World areas where the Soviet empire continues to expand. Hence, the development of a more realistic extension of containment policy requires actions that focus on these latter areas.

To implement the proposed extension and redirection of containment policy, U.S. airlift and sealift forces should be specifically earmarked to provide mobility for forces from the "associated countries" mentioned earlier. If this policy is to be taken seriously, specific U.S. units should also be designated and exercised to provide resupply and logistics support, as well as C³I. These earmarked U.S. forces should be configured to operate in conjunction with the Associated Country Forces (ACF), rather than only with U.S. forces such as the proposed Rapid Deployment Force. While these units would presumably have joint capabilities to provide support for U.S. forces and for the ACF, specific training (including language training), as well as suitable equipment, would be needed if the operations in conjunction with the ACF are to proceed smoothly.

In implementing the declaratory policy of providing support for MNLCI, special organizational and intelligence capabilities would be needed within the U.S. government (see below). In addition, light weapons designed for easy and speedy delivery by air and sea, as well as for easy maintenance and decentralized delivery and use by appropriate "liberation" movements, would be needed. Provision of individually operated anti-tank and anti-air weapons for Afghan "Freedom Fighters" provides an example.

Resource allocations to develop the operational capabilities of the ACF, and to provide support for MNLCI, do not remove the need for the Rapid Deployment Force. Notwithstanding my earlier remarks about the RDF's limited utility for meeting challenges posed by expansion of the Soviet empire, the RDF retains an essential function in these contingencies. This function is to provide a backup to deter Soviet intervention, a strength that would be committed only as a last resort in the event that Soviet forces are directly committed, or seem likely to be. Even unused, the RDF would thus perform an invaluable role as a reassuring guarantor for the ACF. Indeed, without such reassurance, the likelihood of ACF participation would be severely diminished.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES

To implement the declaratory policies and the types of operations described above would require organizational changes within the U.S. government. An organizational arrangement is needed with authority to span the military services and to mobilize the multiple instruments of foreign and defense policy for the purpose of providing support for the ACF and for MNLCI.

To conduct these operations, organizational innovation is needed to provide planning and C³I; to call up airlift, sealift, and logistic support; to provide military and economic aid; and, in some cases, to supply direct financial assistance. No such centralized organizational entity now exists. Instead, the required functions are spread loosely among the Departments of Defense and State and the intelligence community.

PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Forms of U.S. economic and security assistance have typically been considered, planned, and administered separately from one another. Although there have been divergent views on this issue in the recurring debates on foreign assistance, separation between the two has been favored on various grounds. Principal among them is the view that security assistance is a direct or indirect aspect of U.S. defense preparedness, whereas economic and technical aid have a longer-term and

broader relationship to U.S. foreign policy, to a brighter and more progressive image of the United States in the world, and so on.

To implement the objectives and declaratory policies advocated here--both for supporting MNLCI and for developing the ACF--a tighter link is needed between the planning and operational responsibility for economic aid and that for security assistance. Both forms of assistance are instruments of U.S. foreign policy; they are not ends in themselves. To further the aims and declaratory policies proposed here, these programs should be planned and conducted together, permitting them to be more sharply focused toward the achievement of U.S. objectives.⁶

DIPLOMACY AND LINKAGE

The Soviet Union has repeatedly asserted that its support for wars of national liberation, and for Cuban and East German allied or proxy forces in the Third World, is entirely compatible with arms limitation negotiations and with agreements in both the strategic area and the NATO area, as well as with continued economic relations between East and West.⁷

The United States should adopt a similar stance, in public and in the conduct of private diplomacy. U.S. support for MNLCI and for the ACF should not be viewed as incompatible with the pursuit of opportunities for mutual benefit between East and West in the domains of arms limitations and of economic, financial, and technological exchanges. For the United States to conduct diplomacy in support of the extended containment policies advocated here, while at the same time maintaining a receptive stance toward other dimensions of relationships with the Soviet Union, is as difficult a task to bring off domestically, as it is worthwhile internationally, especially in relations with our European allies.

⁶For a more complete exposition of the reasons for forging a closer link between security assistance and economic and technical aid, see "Beyond Containment: Reshaping U.S. Policies Toward the Third World," pp. 22-25.

⁷See, for example, Henry Trofimenko, "The Third World and the U.S. Soviet Competition: A Soviet View," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1981, pp. 1025-1027.

F. Scott Fitzgerald once observed that the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas at the same time, and still retain the capacity for effective action. To create and sustain political support for a "two-track" policy in the domestic political environment of the United States requires first-rate leadership, no less than first-rate intelligence. In principle, and in the abstract, the opportunity exists to link the two: if both tracks are cogently articulated and prudently implemented, they can provide the makings of a reasonable coalition between the "right" and the "left," between "conservatives" and "liberals." Translating the abstract into the concrete is what requires first-rate political leadership.

III. EXTENDING CONTAINMENT IN THE ECONOMIC REALM: ECONOMIC REALISM

It is useful to distinguish three different directions for United States and Western economic policies toward the Soviet Union, although various combinations among them are also possible:

- A. Subsidization by governments to encourage East-West transactions.
- B. Embargoes or sanctions to cut off such transactions.
- C. Removing subsidies and avoiding embargoes, while letting the market function to facilitate or foreclose particular transactions.

Policy (A), subsidization, was pursued in the 1970s by the West in the spirit of détente. This effort was notably unsuccessful, if not perverse, in influencing Soviet behavior along the congenial lines that were hoped for by its advocates. Instead, throughout the decade the Soviets pursued an unprecedented buildup of military power, continued to expand their external empire in Angola, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, invaded Afghanistan (1979), and managed the suppression of Solidarity in Poland (1981).

Policy (B), embargoes, and Policy (C), a strict market regime, would represent a restriction of East-West trade and West-East credits compared with the subsidization policy, A.

Clearly, the side effects of policies (B) and (C) are likely to differ sharply: opposition within the Western alliance to policy (C) would be much more limited than opposition to Policy (B), as was indicated by the overreaction of our European allies to the relatively short-lived embargo by the President on GE compressors for the Yamal pipeline.

Among the three policies, I would ascribe the label of "economic realism" to policy (C), the market regime. Such a policy would, on the one hand, avoid the discredited optimism of the 1970s subsidization

policy, while, on the other, limiting the intra-alliance damage and the serious difficulty of implementation that would ensue if policy (B), embargoes or sanctions, were adopted instead.

This position may seem rather bland. In fact, avoiding subsidization and favoring a strict market calculus are somewhat like balanced budgets and motherhood: most people express support for the principles until specific issues arise, like actually balancing the budget, or deciding whether public support should be allowed for abortions. Then heated controversy emerges, notwithstanding professed support for the general principles. The situation is similar with respect to freeing trade from subsidies and embargoes. General support is expressed for the principle, but sharp differences emerge over specific issues.

For example, the Germans argue that the loan guarantees extended by their Hermes organization do not represent inappropriate subsidies, but simply constitute a normal means of carrying on international trade. In fact, it can be shown that such guarantees really do constitute a subsidy, and the amount of the subsidy is substantial.¹ Similarly, the French say that charging the Russians an interest rate of 9.5 percent on loans connected with the Yamal pipeline does not represent a subsidy, and in any event is a higher rate than the Germans are charging!

To make policy (C), the removal of subsidies, one of "economic realism," requires that certain rules of the game be established for conducting East-West economic relations. Although it is important to seek agreement on these rules within the Alliance, I will argue later that if such agreement is not forthcoming, the United States should pursue and apply these rules unilaterally. The following are examples of the rules that I propose:

1. No loan or investment guarantee should be available to Western lenders or investors engaged in transactions with the East unless these guarantees are extended *without* direct or indirect government underwriting.

¹See Daniel F. Kohler and Kip T. Fisher, *Subsidization of East-West Trade Through Credit Insurance and Loan Guarantees*, The Rand Corporation, N-1951-USDP, January 1983, pp. 43-46.

2. No concessionary interest terms should be available to either government or commercial borrowers in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe. The minimum criterion for implementation of this rule should be that interest rates applying to loans to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should not be less than the *highest* rates charged to domestic or other foreign borrowers on loans of equivalent duration.²
3. No preferential tax treatment should be accorded to either individual or corporate income derived from transactions with the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe (the preferential tax treatment extended under the Domestic International Sales Corporation Program in the United States would have to be modified to comply with this rule).

What is the purpose of these proposed rules? It is fundamentally to reduce and remove the extensive network of subsidies that have undergirded economic transactions with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) over the past decade. These subsidies have contributed to the huge expansion of net West-to-East resource flows totaling more than \$80 billion during the 1970s. The intended result is to restrict such flows in the future to no more than an unsubsidized market would allow. Such restrictions can help, albeit only modestly, to constrain Soviet allocation decisions, to impede the management and expansion of the Soviet empire and, hopefully rather than assuredly, to bring resource pressures to bear in the longer run that will tend to reduce the Soviet military buildup.³

²This rule assumes that the additional political, as well as economic, risk involved in loans to the CMEA countries inevitably makes such loans at least as risky as any other domestic or international loans of equivalent duration. In light of the record of delinquency, due to political and economic circumstances, in these loans in recent years, I think this assumption is justifiable.

³During the past several decades numerous export subsidies have been instituted by Western Europe and the United States. These subsidies distort normal commercial incentives to engage in transactions with the Soviet Union and other CMEA countries. The subsidies--many of which reflect governmental efforts to promote exports and international

Two arguments are usually raised against such attempts to put teeth into the rules of the game of East-West commerce. One is that such measures would amount to economic warfare and would therefore be politically undesirable, especially from the viewpoint of our European allies. The second argument is that, while such rules might have some effect if applied collectively by the West and Japan, collective action is really unlikely, and unilateral application would have only negligible effects. I will consider these arguments in turn.

The term "economic warfare" does not have a precise technical meaning, and the loose and diverse ways in which it has been used in the media and elsewhere have not contributed to resolving this imprecision. The official *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* defines it as "aggressive use of economic means to achieve national objectives." Elsevier's *Economics Dictionary* defines economic warfare as "non-violent activities aimed at making one nation's economy dominant over that of another nation."

A better and more comprehensive definition of economic warfare is presented in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*: "state interference in international economic relations for the purpose of improving the relative economic, military or political position of a country." "Interference" is further described as having two components: "coercion," through denial of trade or resources, or the threat to do so; and "persuasion," through the conferral of economic "favors . . . [by which] a country may expect in return reciprocal favors in the form of political support, or alliance, or perhaps neutrality."⁴

investment in general, rather than only to the CMEA countries--include the following: lending at preferential rates and providing loan guarantees; investment guarantees underwritten by government agencies; and preferential tax treatment of foreign business or personal income. These subsidies are, in the final analysis, borne by the taxpayers of the countries concerned in the form of higher budgetary or "off-budgetary" expenditures. The rules of the game proposed in the text are intended to retract these subsidies as they bear on trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It is to be hoped that such retraction might later be extended to other areas as well.

⁴ *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, p. 471.

According to the last definition, economic warfare includes the conferral of economic "favours." Hence, it would seem that the subsidies provided during the past decade to encourage East-West trade have already constituted a form of economic warfare. Consequently, removing these subsidies can hardly be said to constitute economic warfare!⁵

It may be worth recalling Lenin's maxim: "When we are ready, the West will sell us the rope with which to hang them." While refusing to *sell* the rope may be economic warfare, refusing to give it away or to subsidize its sale is certainly not!

The second argument against my proposed rules of the game is that they cannot be adopted multilaterally, and will be ineffectual if adopted unilaterally. Clearly, multilateral action in concert with our European allies and Japan is far preferable to action by the United States alone. This is partly because the United States has been a minority lender in the West-East capital flows of the past decade--about 15 percent of the total CMEA debt is held by U.S. banks and agencies. Including the "majority" lenders would make the rules more effective. Also, multilateral action would promote rather than strain the cohesion of the Alliance. Nonetheless, I believe that announcing and observing these rules unilaterally, if necessary, would be worthwhile, provided that the action was preceded by a serious effort to convince our allies to join us.

The United States has tremendous influence in the international financial community. If U.S. banks and exporters were to follow these rules, several important consequences would follow:

1. Other members of the international financial community would simply feel less confident about going it alone, without U.S. financial participation in the usual consortium arrangements. While European exporters might realize some one-sided gains, these would probably be short-lived.

⁵It is worth noting, as Robert Loring Allen observes in his *Encyclopedia* article, and as our European allies tend to overlook, that the very act of attempting to use persuasive "favours" may "render the initiator vulnerable. If the trade is large for the recipient, it is also large for the initiator, and the recipient under some circumstances

2. American banks would probably extend more credit domestically, and in other parts of the world than Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, U.S. credit would be redirected, probably with beneficial consequences.
3. Even if the European banks were to continue to extend credits facilitated by government subsidies, I suggest that their asset portfolios would be damaged by the accumulation of questionable loans to the CMEA countries. Consequently, these institutions would become less attractive to depositors and investors than would their American counterparts. Anticipation of this outcome would probably lead the European institutions to follow a more prudent course of action.

Although it is conventional to observe in banking circles that, after all, the Soviet Union itself is a good credit risk, this is a more dubious proposition than most bankers realize. It is true that the financial ratios that bankers typically look at in assessing credit risks are relatively favorable for the Soviet Union. But this is only a small part of the true story. Several adverse, but by no means worst case, contingencies could sharply reverse Soviet financial prospects. Such contingencies would include, for example, reductions in Soviet oil exports and continued soft world oil prices, continued poor Soviet agricultural performance together with large Soviet grain imports at high world prices, and a diminution in the international market for weapons (which has been a major hard-currency earner for the Soviet Union in recent years). Thus, the Soviet Union's hard-currency position is especially vulnerable to adverse changes in only a small set of product and commodity markets. In fact, the creditworthiness of the Soviet Union is more precarious than is usually recognized.

I conclude these remarks concerning economic realism with one slightly whimsical observation. Even if the rules of the game advocated here are not adopted multilaterally, and even if they are applied less rigorously by the United States acting alone than I would like to see,

may subject the initiator to pressure through the same relations that the initiator is employing."

the "invisible hand" of international financial markets may accomplish much of what the visible hand of government does not. In the 1980s, capital is likely to be less readily available in international markets than was the case in the 1970s. The petrodollar recycling phenomenon of that earlier decade is not likely to recur. Hence, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will find their access to foreign borrowing much more restricted than before, even apart from the policies I have proposed.

How would Soviet behavior be affected by the economic realism I have proposed? Three hypotheses can be formulated concerning the likely Soviet response. The first is that what is economic realism to us may be so provocative to the Soviet Union that it might actually devote more, rather than less, effort to military spending, external mischiefmaking, or internal repressiveness, notwithstanding diminution of the aggregate resources on which it could draw.

The second hypothesis is that the Soviets might instead adopt a more accommodating and conciliatory stance, once they became convinced of the firmness and credibility of U.S. and Western intentions.

The third is the "null" hypothesis. Soviet behavior may not be discernibly affected by this policy at all. In general, where the evidence in support of either of the other hypotheses is inconclusive, one should not reject the null hypothesis. Instead, Soviet behavior may be impelled by internal pressures, forces, and factions, and the relative strength of these is unlikely to be influenced by Western economic policy.

I have heard plausible arguments in support of the first two, mutually inconsistent hypotheses. My own inclination runs strongly toward supporting the null hypothesis until much stronger evidence is offered than exists at present in favor of another one. Soviet priorities and behavior are likely to be governed by factors inherent in the Soviet system rather than by changes in Western economic policy, and these factors are very little different for Andropov from what they were for Brezhnev.

This conclusion seems to me to argue strongly in favor of the policy direction of economic realism that I have been advocating. At the least, a policy of restricting resource flows, by removing the subsidies that have lubricated such flows in the past, would place

greater pressure on the Soviet economy in the middle and longer run. Such a policy would thereby tend to expose the inherent economic, political, and social contradictions within the communist system. This is simply a policy of economic realism; it is *not* a policy for bringing the Soviet Union to its knees, or bringing about the "collapse of the Soviet system," as some of the media critics of the policy have occasionally portrayed it. Instead, the effects on Soviet behavior of such a policy would be modest and gradual, and would be felt only over the longer run. This argues for moving our policy in an economically realistic direction now rather than later.

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

None of the proposals described here is incompatible with Aaron Wildavsky's views of "containment plus political action," or with the view that he espouses for trying to sow the seeds of pluralism in Soviet soil by means of broadcasts, cassettes, leaflets, and books composed and transmitted through private American interest groups: environmentalists, women's groups, youth groups, scientific and technical groups, farmers, consumer groups, ethnic groups, labor groups, and the like. I endorse these views. Indeed, the "anti-imperialism" rubric of my earlier remarks can be envisioned as an attempt to plant seeds of pluralism within the external Soviet empire by providing support for movements that seek liberation from communist imperialism, and by trying to develop Associated Country Forces to counter the use of Cuban and East German proxies by the Soviet Union. These measures are essentially pluralistic because they extend containment in the direction of competition.

Nevertheless, even while I applaud efforts to develop pluralism within the Soviet Union, I am skeptical about their effectiveness. I share the view expressed by the principal figure in Saul Bellow's *The Dean's December*:

It was one of the greatest achievements of communism to seal off so many millions of people. You wouldn't have thought it possible in this day and age that the techniques of censorship should equal the techniques of transmission.¹

¹ *The Dean's December*, 1982, p. 63.

